Shailesh Kumar, National Defence
New Delhi, 23 August 2025
On 19th August 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister and Special Representative to India China Boundary Question Wang Yi concluded his meetings with India’s NSA Ajit Doval and met PM Modi in New Delhi. A day later on August 20th Chinese President Xi Jinping arrival in Lhasa capital of Tibet. He was accompanied by senior officials Wang Huning and Cai Qi.
The same day, India’s Strategic Force Command test fires Agni-5 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile from Chandipur, Odisha. On 21st August Xi Jinping participated in grand celebration on the occasion of 60th anniversary of founding of Xizang- or Tibet Autonomous Region founded in 1965.
But this time during his second visit to Lhasa, Xi Jinping did not stop over in Nyingchi. unlike the last visit. Nyingchi, a highly militarized zone is very near to disputed Arunachal border. Xi Jinping’s first visit in July 2021, soon after Galwan Valley clash was a strategic message to India. China has had built civil- military dual use infrastructure on a massive scale at Nyingchi.
Now around a week later Prime Minister Narendra Modi is visiting China’s Tianjin to participate in SCO Summit 2025 on 31st August and 1st September.
India has long recognized Tibet as part of China but past’s follies have led to unresolved disputed boundary between both the countries. What may unfold in next few days should be viewed through the lens of history so we get a clear picture.
After the Galwan Valley incident that led to the martyrdom of 20 Indian Army bravehearts, both India and China signed a border Patrol Agreement in October 2024. After 34th WMCC meeting and 24 rounds of Special Representative talks, all eyes are fixed on upcoming meeting of PM Modi and President Xi Jinping in Tianjin.
India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar emphasized on de-escalation at the border in meeting with his Chinese counterpart. Both leaders expressed satisfaction over Peace and tranquillity that now persists at LAC following dis-engagement.
India also clarified its stand on One China policy vis-à-vis to Taiwan or the Republic of China. But what does the developments mean next for India and Tibetan. So lets first brush up some lessons from history.
Tibet functioned as a de facto independent state post 1912, when the Qing dynasty collapsed. Tibet had its own government, currency, army, and conducted foreign relations, though few countries formally recognized its independence.
China’s founder Mao Zedong soon after establishment of People’s Republic of China in 1949 declared that Tibet was part of China and must be liberated. Following his orders, on 6th October 1950, the People’s Liberation Army launched the Battle of Chamdo in eastern Tibet.
Tibetan forces, fragmented and equipped with traditional weapons, who numbered hardly 8,000–10,000 resisted PLA troops’ massive assault across the Upper Yangtze River. However, after about two weeks of fighting, Chamdo fell on 19th October 1950, and the Tibetan Governor General Ngapo Ngawang Jigme surrendered.
The 14th Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso was just 15 years old at the time. So, because of his young age, political power was exercised by Regent Taktra Rinpoche. The Tibetan cabinet— Kashag decided the Dalai Lama should flee to India.
He was actually moved briefly towards Yatung, near the India-Bhutan border for safety. But on advice from both his officials and India’s representative in Lhasa Sumal Sinha, Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa to maintain authority. India despite his political officer in Lhasa did not intervened directly.
After the one sided battle of Chamdo, PRC halted its advance and pressured Tibetan Government to negotiate. Tibet sent a 5 member delegation to Beijing in 1951 under Governor General Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, who was not jailed but strangely treated respectfully but under extreme duress, the delegation had no freedom to negotiate independently. The delegation without the consent of Dalai Lama or Kashag was forced to sign the Seventeen-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.
With this, Chinese officials and PLA troops entered Lhasa and setup parallel authority. In the beginning, Beijing tried a “united front” strategy, working with Tibetan elites and promising autonomy. But gradually, China increased political, military, and economic control. Land reforms, suppression of religion, and interference in local governance triggered growing resentment.
In Kham and Amdo of eastern Tibet, resistance by local Tibetans and monks was fierce. From 1956 onwards, the PLA began attacking monasteries in Kham / Amdo suspected of sheltering rebels. Many monasteries were bombarded, monks arrested, and religious activities curtailed.
Then came the great mysterious and dramatic escape of his holiness the 14th Dalai Lama in March 1959. News broke that the Chinese PLA planned to abduct or even kill the 14th Dalai Lama. Tens of thousands of Tibetans surrounded his palace in Lhasa, triggering a mass uprising against Chinese rule. The PLA cracked down brutally—shelling the Norbulingka Palace and other Tibetan positions.
Dalai Lama’s escape was orchestrated by Tibetan officials and resistance fighters, especially members of the Chushi Gangdruk resistance army. Dalai Lama, 23 at that time started his journey on 17th March 1959 in the disguise of a PLA soldier. Thousands of his followers joined mid way.
The CIA was already running covert operations in Tibet since the mid-1950s, training Tibetan guerrillas in Colorado and parachuting them back into Tibet. CIA did provide intelligence support. They had trained Tibetan guerrillas who helped guide and protect escape routes for 2 week long journey. The CIA also set up radio communication with the Dalai Lama’s entourage to track his progress.
The Dalai Lama crossed into India at Khenzimane in Arunachal Pradesh, the then North East Frontier Agency on 31 March 1959. Indian border guards received him, and Prime Minister Nehru soon announced asylum to Dalai Lama and his followers.
The PLA knew he had left but failed to intercept. But due to Tibet’s rugged terrain made the pursuit difficult, and partly because local Tibetan resistance forces shielded him.
China later accused the CIA and India of smuggling the Dalai Lama out, however, no evidence of direct Indian involvement emerged in planning the escape.
Dalai Lama, who for years have asked for the independence of Tibet off late changed his stance to the autonomy of Tibet under China’s control. The US and other Western countries did not militarily intervene to stop China. Washington’s main focus at the time was the Korean War that happened between 1950–53 and containing communism in East Asia.
Tibet was considered remote, and the US did not recognize it as an independent state in official policy. The US acknowledged Chinese sovereignty, though sometimes ambiguously. After the 1959 uprising in Lhasa and the Dalai Lama’s flight to India, the CIA helped establish Tibetan resistance in Mustang, Nepal.
By the early 1970s, as President Nixon and Henry Kissinger sought rapprochement with China to subdue Soviet Communism, the US abruptly ended support for the Tibetan resistance. Many Tibetans felt abandoned—Washington had used Tibet mainly as a Cold War tool to harass China. Instead, it gradually shifted to recognizing Tibet as part of China, especially after establishing formal diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979.
Now coming to India’s Historical Position on Tibet. So Pre-1950, Tibet acted as a buffer between India and China. British India had treaties with Tibet, and some recognition of its autonomy, though China always claimed sovereignty. After 1947, independent India inherited this ambiguous situation. When Chinese PLA marched into Tibet in 1950, India’s response was cautious.
India’s boundary with China is divided in three sectors. The Western Sector includes Ladakh and Aksai Chin with 1597 Km boundary whereas, Eastern Sector includes Arunachal Pradesh & Sikkim with 1,346 Km boundary. The middle sector with 545 km is least dispute in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand.
In the 19th century, the British Government proposed different boundary lines — Johnson Line, McCartney–Macdonald Line. Aksai Chin a high-altitude desert was also left ambiguously marked and —British maps kept changing. Tibet and China had no effective control there; locals had grazing rights.
In 1914, during the Simla Conference, the British, Tibet, and China discussed boundaries. British India and Tibet signed the McMahon Line, placing Arunachal, the then North East Frontier Agency within India. China’s representative initiated the draft but later rejected it, saying Tibet had no authority to sign treaties independently. This is the basis of today’s Arunachal Pradesh dispute. While it is clear that Chinese took control of Tibet only in 1950s.
When India became independent, it inherited the British maps showing the McMahon Line and Aksai Chin as Indian territory. But when China invaded Tibet in 1950, Tibet’s role as a buffer state collapsed, and India now directly faced China across the Himalayas. Frictions stared erupting between India and China since 1950s. India protested China’s entry into Tibet but avoided confrontation.
In 1954, the Panchsheel Agreement was signed between India and China, in which India formally recognized Tibet as part of China. However, the border was not demarcated in that agreement—leaving the issue unresolved.
India protested diplomatically but did not intervene militarily. The then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru believed in Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai and wanted to maintain peace. In 1954 PM Nehru signed Panchsheel Agreement with China.
Many call the Panchsheel agreement, India’s biggest strategic blunder that led to loss of bargaining power on Tibet, no border settlement leaving McMohan line in East and Aksai Chin in west disputed, the Hindi Chini narrative celebrated by Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and PM Nehru as model for Asia proved a strategic blind spot for India in 1962 war as India left unprepared while Chinese PLA was prepared militarily.
By Panchsheel Agreement, India effectively recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, giving up the older British-era special privileges. Tibetans often see this as a turning point—India’s formal acceptance weakened Tibet’s international standing. The then Government’s policies resulted in the form of thousands of Tibetans living in India as refugees and the latest generations also allowed to hold Indian passport.
India has hosted the Tibetan Government- in- Exile in Dharamshala for over six decades. Yet, India does not officially recognize Tibet as independent; it accepts Tibet as part of China.
In 1957, India discovered that China had secretly built a strategic highway G- 219 through Aksai Chin, linking Xinjiang and Tibet. India claimed Aksai Chin as part of Ladakh, but China refused to withdraw. This was the first real flashpoint.
The Dalai Lama’s escape to India in 1959 after the Tibetan uprising worsened India and China relations. China accused India of harboring a rebel and questioned India’s right to control its border areas. Small skirmishes began in both western and eastern sectors.
In October 1962, China launched a full-scale war across both Aksai Chin and Arunachal, the then NEFA.
China quickly overran Indian positions but declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew from Arunachal, while retaining Aksai Chin. Since then China controls Aksai Chin while India claims it and India controls Arunachal Pradesh, while China claims it as “South Tibet”.
According to an estimate about 90,000–100,000 Tibetans live in different parts of India mostly on border with China India as Tibetan Government is run from exile in Dharmshala in HP. mostly in Himachal Pradesh.
Their children can get Indian passports if born after 1987 however, there is no provision of dual citizenship. Many Tibetans refugees serve in Special Frontier Force raised in 1962—an elite commando unit under RAW. SFF soldiers fought bravely in the 1971 war against Pakistan and in 2020 Galwan / Chushul clashes with China.
Post Galwan Valley incident, India and China signed a border patrol agreement in Kazan October 2024. In the wake of a disputed border, it is also important to look at treaties and agreement between both the countries.
In 1988– Rajiv Gandhi Visited Beijing. There was no formal treaty signed, but a political breakthrough occurred after decades of frozen ties since 1962 war. Rajiv Gandhi met Chinese President Deng Xiaoping, Premier Li Peng, and General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. The visit Led to setting up of the Joint Working Group on the boundary question while India reiterated its position that Tibet is an autonomous region of China.
Another major border agreement was signed between India and China in 1993 when Indian Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao’s met Chinese Premier Li Peng and President Jiang Zemin.
The Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquality along the LAC. This was the first major border agreement where both sides agreed to respect the LAC until the boundary is resolved. Both sides agreed to avoid use of force and limit military activities near LAC.
India’s President Shankar Dayal Sharma during state visit to China signed agreement on 29th Nov 1996 with his Chinese counterpart President Jiang Zemin. The agreement focussed on CBMs in the Military Field along the LAC. This put restriction on major military exercises near the LAC. Advance notification of exercises. Limits on use of combat aircraft and firing within 20 km of the LAC.
In June 2003, when the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Beijing in June 2003, India and China signed several agreements, and one of the most significant was on Tibet and Sikkim. For the first time in writing, India explicitly stated that the “Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.”
This went beyond Nehru’s 1954 language, which only called Tibet a “Region of China” without explicitly endorsing China’s sovereignty in such clear terms. Vajpayee’s statement with Premier Web Jaibao removed any lingering ambiguity in India’s position. At the same time in return, China acknowledged Sikkim as part of India. By 2005, China officially confirmed in bilateral talks that Sikkim was part of India.
In 2005 – Agreement signed between Natwar Singh, the then Indian External Affairs Minister and Chiense FM Li Zhaoxing on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question was signed during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India. Any boundary settlement should safeguard settled populations, which was a subtle recognition of Arunachal Pradesh’s status. Mutual and equal security was seen as a step forward, but progress later stalled.
In 2012, the then EAM S. M. Krishna, and Yang Jiechi signed Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination. WMCC created to handle border affairs. The WMCC is composed of diplomatic and military officials. It is not meant to discuss boundary settlement, but to ensure peace and resolve face-offs quickly.
In 2013 during PM Manmohan Singh’s visit to Beijing both countries signed Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), which ensured no tailing patrols to avoid standoffs; Flag meetings and hotlines; Cooperation in case of natural disasters.
After Doklam standoff in 2017, India China tried to reset ties through the Wuhan Summit in 2018 and Chennai Summit in 2019.
After long pending standoff due to Galwan Valley clash, both countries signed border patrol agreements in Kazan in October last year when PM Modi and President Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of BRICS Summit.
So, if both countries are on a normalization path with renewed Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, people to people contact, flights connectivity and resumption of border trade, then why India test fired its strategic nuclear capable Agni-5 missile.
It could be because the very next day after talks with India, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi visited Pakistan, India’s staunch enemy. While, India does not look for any conflict with China and want to reciprocate cozying up with China, test firing of Agni-5 missile is a strategic signal to both Pakistan and China against any misadventure by Pakistan. During Wang Yi Pakistan visit, both countries announced new China Pakistan Economic Corridor projects.
With renewed focus on CPEC, which impinges on India’s sovereignty, India sends a strategic signal as Agni-5 missile is capable of hitting targets as long as whole of Pakistan and even China’s North side.
India’s stand on Tibet is no different than the United States, who also considers Tibet as part of China but China alleges United States of bullying on its human rights records. Similarly United Nations General Assembly till now has passed 3 resolution on Tibet.
Passed on 21 October 1959 during the 834th plenary meeting, Resolution 1353[1] expressed grave concerns about the violation of the Tibetan people’s fundamental human rights and freedoms, and cited official statement made by the 14th Dalai Lama.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1723 Passed on 20 December 1961 during the 1085th plenary meeting, Resolution 1723[2] solemnly called for the cessation of violating the Tibetan people’s rights including right to self-determination.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2079 Passed on 18 December 1965 during the 1403rd plenary meeting, Resolution 2079 [3] declared the United Nation’s conviction that the violation of the Tibetan people’s freedoms and the suppression of their cultural and religious life increase international tensions and embitter relations among peoples.
Even though Dalai Lama has given up Tibet’s freedom cause, Indian Government stated categorically that no political activities run from the soil of India. Yet, Chinese Communist Party is apprehensive and very sensitive on Tibet issue. President Xi Jinping has announced massive infrastructure project including 167 billion dollar Medong Hydropower Station, which is also referred to as the Yarlung Zangbo hydropower project.
Another project announced by Xi Jinping is Sichuan–Tibet Railway or Chengdu–Lhasa that span approximately 1,629 km, is estimated to cost about US $ 50 billion. Xi’s push is of having a greater integration with the mainland.
It has developed civilian and military infrastructure along the LAC with high quality roads that are dual purpose where even fighter aircraft can land or take off. India too in recent years under Modi Government has pursued a great push on infrastructure where BRO has taken the lead. Galwan was fallout of such infra development.
India’s Darbuk–Shyok–Daulat Beg Oldie road, which is about 255 km connects Leh to Daulat Beg Oldie, the northernmost military post near the Karakoram Pass. The road completed by the BRO around 2019, gave India all-weather access to a region earlier dependent on fragile tracks.
BRO also built a bridge across the Galwan river to connect the DSDBO road to forward positions. China viewed these projects as a direct challenge to its position in Aksai Chin, because The Darbuk–Shyok DBO road improves India’s ability to mobilize troops and supplies quickly along the Line of Actual Control.
Yet, people living in those border areas suggest that Indian road infrastructure is way deep inside Indian territory perhaps India does not want any confrontation with its Northern neighbour, who does not recognize most of the 3488 km long.
Once again eyes are set on both the leaders in the wake of Trump’s unjustified tariffs on India. It is to be seen if progress on border talks is satisfactory leading to de-escalation and further agreements to settle long pending India China border dispute may be complete border in Ladakh area or at least in some part of the boundary. National Defence believes in our Prime Minister’s philosophy of Vasudhaiv Kutumbakam at the same time developing military capabilities to deter any form of aggression against India that stands for Peace.
About the author: Shailesh Kumar, found editor of National Defence is Indian journalist with over 24 years of working experience. He has previously reported for The Pioneer, The Day After, Centre For Science & Environment, BAG Films, Star News (now ABP News), India TV, News X and News 24. He can be reached at: shailesh.news76@gmail.com.
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